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There	is	no	concept	more	important	for	clear	thinking	about	medical	ethics	than	the	
concept	 of	well-being	 or	 (what	 I	 take	 to	 be	 the	 same	 thing)	 the	 concept	 of	what’s	
good	for	a	person.	Yet	for	a	variety	of	reasons	medical	ethicists	have	generally	had	
little	 to	 say	 about	 this	 notion	 and	 have	 tended	 not	 to	 engage	 much	 with	 the	
philosophical	 literature	on	 this	 topic.	A	brief	 look	at	 the	many	 textbooks	available	
for	 teaching	 medical	 ethics	 to	 both	 pre-med	 and	 medical	 students	 reveals	 that	
almost	none	of	 them	deal	with	 this	 topic.1	And	a	 review	of	 the	bioethics	 scholarly	
literature	 reveals	 that	 the	 topic	 is	 not	 often	 discussed	 there.2	Even	 the	 chapter	
devoted	 to	 the	principle	of	beneficence	 in	Beauchamp	and	Childress’s	Principles	of	
																																																								
1	To	substantiate	this	claim,	I	borrow	a	move	from	David	DeGrazia	(1995).	He	argued	some	time	ago	
that	 bioethicists	 rarely	 pay	 attention	 to	 the	 philosophy	 of	 well-being	 either	 in	 scholarship	 or	
teaching.	 To	 document	 this	 he	 examined	 the	most	 prominent	 bioethics	 textbooks	 at	 the	 time	 and	
found	no	philosophical	discussion	of	well-being.	Borrowing	his	strategy,	I	have	looked	at	most	of	the	
current	 popular	 textbooks	 and	 I	 have	 also	 found	 that	 none	 of	 them	 discuss	 well-being.	 The	 nine	
books	I	examined	are	included	in	the	list	of	references	and	have	a	**	after	the	entry.			
	
2	Bioethics	 journals	 tend	 to	 be	 catalogued	 in	 databases	 of	 philosophy	 as	 well	 as	 databases	 of	
medicine.	 When	 I	 search	 terms	 like	 “well-being,”	 “welfare,”	 or	 “best	 interests”	 on	 philosophy	
databases,	I	find	mostly	papers	about	well-being	with	no	connection	to	medicine.	Searching	the	same	
terms	 in	medical	databases	mostly	brings	up	either	medical	articles	 that	use	one	of	 these	 terms	 in	
passing,	 or	 empirical	 studies	 of	 particular	 patient	 groups	 self-reporting	 how	 they	 feel	 about	 their	
lives.	 Only	 a	 tiny	 percent	 of	 articles	 or	monographs	 analyze	well-being	 or	 use	more	 sophisticated	
analyses	of	well-being	in	making	ethical	arguments.	There	are,	of	course,	exceptions	to	the	rule.	Here	
I	am	merely	documenting	a	trend.		
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Biomedical	 Ethics—arguably	 one	 of	 the	 most	 influential	 medical	 ethics	 texts—
doesn’t	 try	 to	analyze	welfare	at	all	or	even	consider	how	welfare	values	relate	 to	
medical	values.3		
	 Of	course,	 I	realize	that	the	practical	day-to-day	world	of	medicine	 is	 full	of	
discussions	of	well-being,	 best	 interests,	 and	quality	of	 life,	 and	no	doubt	 some	of	
these	 discussions	 are	 sophisticated	 and	 probing.	 But	 I	 remain	 convinced	 that	
medical	ethics	education	would	be	much	better	if	students	were	taught	to	think	in	a	
more	 substantial	 and	 structured	 way	 about	 well-being.	 And	 for	 that	 to	 happen	
medical	ethicists	must	first	adopt	a	more	substantial	and	structured	way	of	thinking	
about	well-being.		
	 Nonetheless,	 it	 is	 not	 at	 all	 obvious	 how	 to	 bring	 this	 about.	 Many	
philosophers,	presented	with	such	a	problem,	would	think	it	appropriate	to	simply	
add	some	basic	material	on	the	philosophy	of	well-being,	most	likely	an	exposition	
of	 three	 standard	 types	 of	 well-being	 theory	 (“the	 big	 three”):	 hedonism,	 desire	
theories	 and	 objective	 list	 theories	 (Griffin	 1986;	 Parfit	 1984).	 However,	my	 own	
experience	 over	 time	 has	 led	 me	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 standard	 philosophical	
approaches	 to	 the	 theory	 of	 well-being	 are	 of	 almost	 no	 use	 in	 the	 context	 of	
teaching	practical	ethics.	But	if	we	want	to	teach	people	to	approach	the	topic	in	a	
more	 sophisticated	 way,	 and	 if	 the	 traditional	 philosophical	 theories	 are	 useless,	
																																																								
3	Originally	published	in	1979	it	is	now	in	its	7th	edition.	
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what	 are	 we	 to	 do?	 How	 should	 we	 think	 about	 welfare	 in	 the	 practical	 medical	
ethics	 context?	And	why	 suppose	 that	philosophy	has	 anything	 to	offer	us	on	 this	
front	(given	that,	as	I	claim,	its	standard	material	on	this	topic	is	not	useful)?		
	 Over	 time	 I	have	developed	an	approach	which	 is	philosophically	 informed	
yet	avoids	discussion	of	 the	big	 three	 theories.	 It	 is	what	 I	 think	of	as	 the	 “theory-
without-theories”	 approach	 to	 teaching,	 thinking	 and	 writing	 about	 well-being	 in	
practical	 ethical	 contexts.4	It	 has	 two	 elements.	 First	 is	 a	 focus	 on	 examining	
important	 and	 relatively	 uncontroversial	 constituents	 of	 welfare.	 These	 elements	
can	be	introduced	and	their	nature	questioned	and	probed	without	invoking	general	
theories.	 The	 second	 key	 element	 is	 a	 framework	 for	 thinking	 about	 choice	 in	
relation	to	welfare,	a	framework	that	I	refer	to	as	“the	mild	objectivity	framework.”	
																																																								
	
4		 Anna	 Alexandrova	 (2017)	 has	 recently	 argued	 that	 philosophy	 should	 devote	more	 attention	 to	
developing	 what	 she	 calls	 “mid-level	 theories	 of	 welfare.”	 There	 are	 real	 and	 important	 parallels	
between	her	concerns	and	mine.	For	example,	we	both	agree	that	general	philosophical	theories	are	
incredibly	 hard	 to	 relate	 to	 real	 life	 and	 that	 something	 else	 is	 therefore	 needed.	 Indeed,	 from	 a	
certain	standpoint,	I	could	be	viewed	as	offering	here	a	mid-level	theory	of	welfare	for	medical	ethics.	
Still,	 there	are	differences.	Alexandrova	emphasizes	the	need	to	develop	mid-level	 theories	of	well-
being	 for	specific	populations	or	groups	of	people,	 for	example,	 children,	or	poor	single	mothers.	My	
approach	here,	however,	has	been	to	develop	a	mid-level	theory	for	a	certain	kind	of	context,	namely	
the	 doctor-patient	 clinical	 context.	 Alexandrova	 also	 believes	 there	 is	 no	 single	 concept	 of	welfare	
and	 no	 single	 real	 world	 phenomenon	 that	 such	 a	 concept,	 if	 it	 existed,	 could	 track.	 I	 believe,	
however,	 that	 there	 is	both	a	single	concept	and	a	single	phenomenon	for	which	we	are	seeking	to	
develop	 theories.	 It	 is	only	because	certain	constructs	or	simplifications	 “get	 it	 right”	often	enough	
that	 we	 view	 them	 as	 useful	 substitutes	 in	 certain	 contexts	 for	 the	 more	 complicated	 and	
controversial	reality.		That	is	the	spirit	in	which	my	framework	is	offered.	I	believe	it	will	“get	it	right”	
often	 enough	 to	 be	 incredibly	 useful,	 even	 though	 to	 use	 it	 we	 do	 not	 have	 to	 settle	 deeper	
philosophical	debates.	See	also	Hawkins	(2019c).	
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In	 what	 follows,	 I	 aim	 to	 convince	 readers,	 first,	 that	 the	 standard	 philosophical	
approach	will	not	work	in	the	practical	context,	and	second,	that	the	theory-without-
theories	approach	will.	After	a	brief	review	of	some	basic	terrain	in	§1,	I	turn	in	§2	to	
explaining	why	I	find	the	standard	philosophical	approaches	so	unhelpful.	§3	is	then	
devoted	 to	 laying	 out	 the	 elements	 of	 the	 theory-without-theory	 approach	 and	
illustrating	its	usefulness	with	examples.		
	 I	 am	well	 aware	 that	 I	 have,	 so	 to	 speak,	 presented	myself	 with	 quite	 the	
argumentative	challenge,	for	there	are	critics	from	very	different	camps	to	convince.	
Many	 bioethicists	 remain	 deeply	 skeptical	 of	 the	 relevance	 of	 thinking	 in	 depth	
about	well-being,	and	perhaps	even	more	skeptical	about	introducing	philosophical	
theories.	 	 If	 these	 readers	 focus	 exclusively	 on	 the	 arguments	 of	 §2,	 they	 may	
conclude	that	I	have	made	their	case	for	them:	philosophical	work	on	well-being	has	
nothing	to	contribute.	The	challenge	here	is	to	convince	these	readers	that	the	ideas	
canvassed	 in	§3	are	both	 substantive	and	useful.	Many	philosophers,	on	 the	other	
hand,	will	no	doubt	think	I	am	selling	philosophy	short,	and	that	I	have	excluded	far	
too	much.	They	may	wish	to	take	issue	with	my	claims	in	§2.	The	challenge	here	is	to	
convince	 them	that	giving	up	on	a	certain	 type	of	 theory	 in	 the	practical	sphere	 is	
not	 giving	 up	 on	 theory	 altogether.	 In	 short,	 one	 group	 may	 wish	 to	 eliminate	
theoretical	 discussions	 of	 welfare	 altogether,	 seeing	 them	 as	 useless,	 while	 a	
different	group	may	accept	the	value	of	such	discussions	but	wish	to	conduct	them	
quite	differently,	namely,	by	returning	to	a	theory-based	approach.	The	trick	then	is	
to	 convince	 people	 that	 the	 theory-without-theories	 approach	 really	 can	 help	 to	
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improve	 thinking	about	 important	medical	ethics	cases,	and	can	do	so	better	 than	
standard	philosophical	approaches.			 	
	
§1.0	Preliminaries		
	
It	 is	 important	 to	 identify	 here	 at	 the	 outset	 the	 precise	 concept	 we	 are	 talking	
about.	Philosophers	struggle	with	 terminology	 in	 this	domain,	because	the	English	
words	 traditionally	 used	 in	 philosophy	 have	 developed	 a	 very	 different	 set	 of	
meanings	 outside	 the	 discipline,	 which	 then	 cause	 confusion	 when	 philosophers	
introduce	 them	 into	 discussions	 aimed	 at	 a	 broader	 audience.	 For	 example,	
philosophers	primarily	 talk	 about	 “well-being”	 or	 less	 commonly	 “welfare,”	 but	 in	
ordinary	 English	 (at	 least	 in	 the	 U.S.)	 “well-being”	 has	 come	 to	 be	 largely	
synonymous	with	a	holistic	concept	of	health.	This	is	problematic	because	health	is	
much	narrower	than	what	philosophers	wish	to	discuss.	Indeed,	part	of	what	needs	
to	 be	 strongly	 emphasized	 in	 the	 medical	 context	 is	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 things	
beyond	health	(and	beyond	medical	values	generally)	need	to	be	considered	when	
significant	decisions	are	made.	Philosophers	who	discuss	well-being	are	discussing	
what	it	is	that	makes	a	life	overall	good	for	the	person	living	it.	Obviously	many	things	
contribute	to	the	goodness	of	a	life	beyond	health.	Still,	although	problematic	in	this	
way,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 that	 any	 other	 term	 is	 significantly	 better	 and	 so	 I	 shall,	with	
some	trepidation,	stick	to	it	and	its	close	cousin	“welfare.”				
	 It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 identify,	 even	 if	 only	 briefly,	 some	 of	 the	 untutored	
assumptions	about	well-being	that	are	common,	but	which	cause	problems	when	we	
try	to	use	them	to	think	critically	about	patient	choice	in	medical	contexts.	There	are	
at	 least	 three	 worth	 identifying	 precisely	 so	 we	 can	 set	 them	 aside.	 The	 first	 is	
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welfare	nihilism,	the	claim	that	there	simply	are	no	facts	about	what	is	good	or	bad	
for	 people,	 and	 so	 nothing	 for	 others	 to	 theorize	 about.	 Such	 claims	 are	 common	
among	 students,	 and	 in	 my	 experience	 typically	 emerge	 in	 response	 to	 difficult	
cases,	where	it	is	hard	for	anyone	to	know	what	would	be	best.	However,	I	seriously	
doubt	 that	most	of	 the	people	who	say	such	 things	really	believe	 them.	After	all,	 I	
doubt	they	would	be	tempted	in	their	own	case	to	approach	an	important	life	choice	
by	simply	flipping	a	coin—an	approach	that	makes	perfect	sense	if	there	really	are	
no	answers	or	if	all	answers	are	equal.	
	 Espousal	of	welfare	nihilism	is	also	sometimes	motivated	by	a	general	desire	
to	 avoid	 seeming	 paternalistic,	 as	 if	 just	 talking	 about	 what	 might	 be	 good	 for	
someone	(other	than	oneself)	is	problematic.	However,	despite	what	some	students	
initially	 assume,	 conversations	 with	 patients	 about	 their	 welfare	 are	 not	 morally	
problematic,	 nor	 is	 it	 wrong	 if	 occasionally,	 and	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 good	 reasons,	 a	
doctor	 seeks	 to	 rationally	 persuade	 a	 patient	 to	 change	his	mind	 for	 the	 patient’s	
own	good.		Conversations	must	be	respectful,	and	ultimate	choice	must	lie	with	the	
patient,	 but	 provided	 these	 constraints	 are	met,	 conversation	 is	 a	 good	 thing,	 not	
bad.5			
																																																								
5	There	 is	evidence	in	the	medical	 literature	that	not	only	students,	but	clinicians	often	fall	 into	the	
trap	of	 thinking	 that	offering	opinions	about	what	would	be	best	 is	objectionably	paternalistic.	For	
example,	Savulescu	(1995)	rejects	what	he	calls	the	“the	fact-provider”	view	of	the	role	of	physicians	
which	he	claims	became	popular	because	it	was	viewed	as	most	consistent	with	avoiding	paternalism.	
Instead,	he	argues	in	favor	of	having	doctors	make	substantive	value	judgments	about	what	would	be	
best	overall	for	their	patients,	and	he	is	careful	to	explain	why	this	need	not	be	morally	objectionable.	
He	reiterates	these	ideas	in	Savulescu	(2007).	
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	 A	 second	 common	 assumption	 is	welfare	medicalism,	which	 is	my	 label	 for	
the	tendency	to	think	about	patient	welfare	in	terms	of	purely	medical	values.	It	is	
the	 assumption	 that	 what	 is	 good	 for	 a	 patient	 is	 simply	 whatever	 is	 normally	
medically	indicated	in	situations	like	the	patient’s.	Medicine	has	a	number	of	distinct	
values,	 as	 represented	 by	 the	 various	 goals	 it	 pursues:	 preventing	 illness,	 curing	
illness,	managing	symptoms	in	chronic	illness	when	cure	is	not	possible,	extending	
life,	 restoring	 function	 that	 has	 been	 lost,	 preventing	 the	 loss	 of	 function,	 and	
relieving	suffering	(and	this	list	is	not	exhaustive).	In	addition,	medicine	has	typical	
ways	 of	 prioritizing	 among	 these	 values,	 ways	 that	 reflect	 long-standing	 medical	
experience	and	 the	preferences	of	a	majority	of	patients.	Thus	 it	 is	often	 true	 that	
pursuing	the	medical	value	usually	pursued	 in	such	situations	(e.g.	extending	 life),	
will	in	fact	be	best	for	the	patient.	But	this	is	not	always	the	case.	Few	people	these	
days	consciously	embrace	such	a	view,	but	many	people	nonetheless	slip	 into	 this	
way	of	thinking	in	part	because	it	is	so	often	adequate,	and	in	part	because	they	are	
not	sure	how	else	to	think	about	individual	patient	welfare.	However,	the	discipline	
of	bioethics	was	largely	built	on	cases	where	what	was	best	overall	 for	the	patient	
departed	 from	medical	norm.	Clearly	 then,	 to	address	 the	most	pressing	 cases	we	
need	 a	 better	way	of	 thinking	 about	 the	 relationship	between	medical	 values	 and	
overall	patient	welfare.			 	
	 By	 far	 the	 most	 common	 assumption	 about	 welfare	 in	 medical	 ethics	 is	 a	
simple	 version	 of	welfare	 subjectivism.	 Indeed,	 insofar	 as	 the	 field	 can	 be	 said	 to	
possess	any	general	framework	for	thinking	about	the	relationship	between	medical	
values	 and	welfare,	 this	 is	 it.	Welfare	 subjectivism	 comes	 in	 two	 varieties.	On	 the	
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simplest	version	what	is	best	for	a	person	is	for	her	to	get	what	she	currently	most	
wants.	This	view	 leaves	no	room	for	error,	making	 the	subject	 infallible	about	her	
own	 good.	 A	 slightly	 more	 sophisticated	 version—welfare	 subjectivism*—	
introduces	a	distinction	between	transient	(usually	emotionally	based)	desires,	and	
more	 enduring	 values.	 The	 patient’s	 welfare	 is	 then	 identified	 with	 receiving	
whatever	 these	 more	 stable	 values	 dictate.	 Welfare	 subjectivism*	 thus	 creates	 a	
little	bit	of	room	for	cases	in	which	what	a	person	chooses	is	not	really	good	for	her.	
Still,	 only	 a	 very	 narrow	 kind	 of	 judgmental	 mistake	 is	 possible,	 and	 there	 is	 no	
room	on	either	version	of	welfare	subjectivism	for	the	thought	that	getting	what	is	
dictated	by	her	current	values	might	not	be	good	for	a	person.			
	 As	an	example	of	the	implicit	assumption	of	welfare	subjectivism*	consider	a	
oft-cited	 article	 by	 Dan	 Brock	 and	 Stephen	 Wartman	 (1990)	 entitled,	 “When	
Competent	 Patients	 Make	 Irrational	 Decisions.”	 The	 authors	 note	 that	 even	
competent	 patients	 sometimes	make	 poor	 choices,	 and	 they	 present	 their	 aim	 as	
that	of	helping	clinicians	 identify	such	decisions.	 If	clinicians	can	become	better	at	
recognizing	 poor	 choices,	 they	 will	 be	 more	 likely	 to	 try	 to	 persuade	 patients	 to	
make	better	ones.	Although	the	language	of	‘better’	and	‘worse’	is	used	throughout,	
the	language	of	welfare	is	not.	But	it	is	natural	to	suppose	that	what	makes	a	choice	
worrisome	 (and	 thus	worthy	 of	 persuading	 a	 patient	 not	 to	 act	 on	 it)	 is	 that	 the	
choice	 goes	 against	 the	 patient’s	 own	 interests,	 i.e.	 it	 is	 (relative	 to	 the	 available	
options)	bad	for	the	patient.	
	 However,	 what	 Brock	 and	 Wartman	 rely	 on	 is	 the	 welfare	 subjectivist*	
distinction	between	 transient	desires	and	 real	values.	Thus	what	 they	aim	 to	help	
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clinicians	 do	 is	 recognize	 cases	 where	 patients	 may	 be	 allowing	 temporary	
distractions	 or	 fears	 (e.g.	 fear	 of	 surgical	 procedures)	 to	 dictate	 choices	 that	 go	
against	their	own	more	enduring	values.	The	whole	framework	suggests	that	the	only	
kind	 of	 error	 possible	 when	 making	 medical	 choices	 is	 a	 kind	 of	 instrumental	
irrationality,	 a	 failure	 to	get	what	one	 really	wants.	There	 is	no	 recognition	of	 the	
fact	that	in	some	cases,	even	if	a	patient	gets	what	she	wants,	she	may	not	be	better	
off.	And	of	course	there	is	no	discussion	at	all	of	what	it	really	means	to	be	better	off.			
	 This	 theme	 is	 taken	up	and	amplified	 in	a	widely	anthologized	paper	 “Four	
Models	 of	 the	 Physician-Patient	 Relationship”	 (Emanuel	 and	 Emanuel	 1992).	 The	
paper	 is	 about	 medical	 decision-making	 in	 the	 era	 of	 patient	 rights,	 and	 it	 is	
concerned	with	identifying	the	right	balance	between	empowering	patients	to	act	on	
their	values	and	helping	patients	 to	make	good	decisions.	 	Once	again,	 the	natural	
assumption	of	readers	would	be	that	the	aim	of	good	decision-making	is	what	is	best	
for	 the	 patient	 from	 the	welfare	 standpoint.	 But	 nowhere	 does	 the	 paper	 directly	
address	 this.	 	 The	 first	 model	 (the	 “paternalistic	 model”)	 depicts	 the	 physician	
making	 decisions	 in	 accordance	 with	 welfare	 medicalism	 without	 consulting	 the	
patient’s	 values	 and	 it	 is	 quickly	 set	 aside	 as	 ethically	 unsatisfactory.	 The	 second	
model	(the	“informative	model”)	depicts	a	patient	making	decisions	based	purely	on	
what	she	wants,	but	without	much	sense	of	how	her	values	could	be	best	realized	by	
her	medical	options.	It	too	is	quickly	set	aside.		
	 The	 third	model	 (the	 “interpretive	model”)	 is	 one	 of	 two	 that	 the	 authors	
present	 as	 real	 candidates.	 	 But	 the	 interpretive	 model	 is	 just	 a	 more	 nuanced	
version	of	the	informative	model.	It	presents	the	doctor’s	goal	as	that	of	helping	the	
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patient	 identify	her	values	and	how	to	best	realize	 those	values	given	her	medical	
options.	 Since	 success	 means	 that	 the	 patient	 realizes	 her	 current	 values	 this	
strongly	suggests	welfare	subjectivism.*		As	with	Brock	and	Wartman	there	is	never	
any	recognition	in	the	article	that	a	patient	might	get	what	she	currently	values	and	
be	no	better	off.			
	 The	final	(“deliberative”)	model	departs	somewhat	from	the	focus	on	patient	
values,	 but	 not	 in	 any	 way	more	 likely	 to	 track	 patient	 welfare.	 The	 deliberative	
model	builds	on	the	interpretive	model,	requiring	the	physician	to	help	the	patient	
identify	what	will	best	promote	her	current	values,	but	adding	that	physicians	are	
also	 allowed	 to	 be	 advocates	 for	 certain	medical	 values	 (e.g.	 not-smoking,	weight	
loss)	even	 if	 these	values	do	not	align	with	 the	patient’s	 current	values	at	all.	The	
deliberative	 model	 is	 thus	 the	 only	 model	 (other	 than	 the	 decisively	 rejected	
paternalistic	model)	 that	 suggests	 that	 a	 clinician	might	 reasonably	 be	 allowed	 to	
advocate	 for	 something	 other	 than	 the	 patient’s	 current	 values.	 But	 it	 is	 left	
mysterious	why	 this	 should	 be	 permitted.	 Presumably	 the	 only	 reason	 a	 clinician	
would	justifiably	advocate	for	values	that	are	not	currently	embraced	by	the	patient	
would	be	 if	 it	 genuinely	 seemed	 that	pursuit	 of	 these	new	values	would	be	better	
overall	 for	 the	patient	 than	 pursuit	 of	 her	 currently	 held	 values.	 But	 this	 is	 never	
said.	Thus	the	deliberative	model	remains	unconvincing,	since,	as	we	know,	medical	
values	in	themselves	are	not	always	good	for	patients,	and	no	explicit	link	is	drawn	
between	advocating	for	medical	values	and	the	patient’s	overall	welfare.					
	 	There	are	many,	many	other	examples	in	the	literature	I	could	cite,	but	the	
point	would	be	the	same:	medical	ethicists	often	treat	the	project	of	helping	patients	
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make	better	choices	as	simply	equivalent	to	helping	them	get	what	they	really	value.	
Welfare	 subjectivism*	 is	 implicit	 throughout	much	of	 the	 literature.	But	 since	 it	 is	
clear	that	people	sometimes	get	what	they	most	want	and	are	worse	off	for	it	(from	
their	own	perspective),	this	is	not	an	adequate	view.	The	popularity	of	this	approach	
no	doubt	stems	from	the	fact	that	a	patient’s	values	are	clearly	important.		They	are	
useful	sources	of	 information	about	the	person,	and	in	a	fair	number	of	cases	they	
are	 reliable	 guides	 to	what	will	 benefit	 the	person.	But	 there	 are	 enough	 cases	 in	
medicine	 where	 this	 assumption	 fails	 that	 we	 need	 a	 better,	 more	 sophisticated	
framework	for	thinking	about	welfare.		
	 To	sum	up:	Welfare	nihilism	is	false.	Welfare	medicalism,	though	part	of	the	
day-to-day	culture	of	medicine,	 is	at	best	a	decision-making	heuristic	 that	delivers	
the	 right	 verdict	 in	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 cases.	 Welfare	 subjectivism,	 even	 in	 its	
slightly	 more	 sophisticated	 form,	 welfare	 subjectivism,*	 is	 also	 at	 best	 a	 kind	 of	
heuristic—useful	in	some	cases	and	not	at	all	in	others.		We	can	do	better.			
	
§2.0			Reconceiving	the	Topic	Area		
The	much	 better	 approach	we	 need,	 however,	 is	 not	 to	 be	 found	 currently	 in	 the	
philosophical	 literature	 on	well-being.	 Or	 so	 I	 wish	 to	 argue.	 For	many	 years	 the	
canonical	way	to	introduce	the	topic	of	well-being	has	been	to	introduce	students	to	
over-arching	 theories	about	 the	nature	of	well-being.	And	the	canonical	way	to	do	
this	 has	 been	 to	 start	 with	 a	 three-part	 division	 of	 theories	 derived	 from	 James	
Griffin	(1986)	and	Derek	Parfit	(1984):	hedonism,	desire	theories,	and	objective	list	
theories,	or	“the	big	three.”	My	claim,	however,	is	that	introducing	these	theories	is	
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unhelpful	and	should	be	abandoned	for	the	purposes	of	doing	practical	ethics.	There	
are	various	reasons	for	this,	some	quite	general,	having	to	do	with	the	difficulty	of	
helping	students	bridge	the	gap	between	theory	and	application,	and	some	specific	
to	the	particular	theories	mentioned	above.		
	 The	most	general	reason	for	not	starting	this	way	 is	 that	 these	theories	are	
too	abstract	 to	be	of	much	practical	use.6	Thus	 in	order	to	have	them	help	us	with	
practical	 ethical	 topics	 we	 need	 to	 do	 a	 lot	 of	 work—work	 that	 is	 both	 too	
complicated	 and	 too	 lengthy—before	we	 can	move	 ahead.	 Consider	 first	 that	 the	
simplest	 version	 of	 each	 theory	 faces	 numerous,	 well-known	 objections,	 most	 of	
which	are	quite	powerful.		We	would	not	want	to	simply	“apply”	a	simple	version	of	
any	one	of	the	big	three—given	how	much	agreement	there	is	that	the	simple	views	
are	 flawed.	 Of	 course,	 over	 time	 and	 in	 response	 to	 these	 objections	 many	
modifications	 have	 been	 proposed.	 But	 to	 avoid	 the	 simplistic	 versions	 and	make	
use	of	these	advances	one	must,	almost	as	soon	as	each	theory	is	presented,	begin	
exploring	 the	 variety	 of	 ways	 of	 modifying	 it.	 Numerous	 theoretical	 choices—
choices	that	philosophers	routinely	agonize	over—will	have	to	be	made	before	one	
can	hope	to	move	towards	application.	But	that’s	not	feasible	for	practical	ethics.		
	 Even	once	the	initial	theoretical	decisions	have	been	made,	it	is	still	true	that	
many	 theories	of	well-being	are	 incomplete	 in	ways	 that	hinder	practical	use.	 	To	
																																																								
6	Hall	 (2016)	 also	 argues	 that	 standard	 philosophical	 theories	 are	 of	 little	 use	 in	 practical	 ethics	
because	of	 the	difficulty	of	moving	 from	theory	 to	any	kind	of	concrete	decision.	And	also,	 like	me,	
she	points	out	 that	 objective	 list	 theories	 typically	 fail	 to	 give	us	 any	guidance	 at	 all	 about	how	 to	
make	trade-offs	between	conflicting	objective	goods.		
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give	 just	 one	 example,	 proponents	 of	 objective	 list	 theories	 rarely	 address	 the	
question	of	whether	all	or	some	of	the	items	on	the	list	are	necessary	for	a	good	life	
(such	that	lack	of	an	item	makes	a	life	much	less	good	independently	of	how	many	
other	goods	an	individual	has)	or	whether	a	good	life	simply	requires	that	one	have	
a	certain	number	of	goods	from	the	list.	Nor	is	it	usually	made	clear	how	the	items	
on	 the	 list	 are	 ranked,	 i.e.	 how	 good	 each	 item	 is	 in	 comparison	 to	 others.	 This	
matters,	 however,	 since	 real	 life	 forces	 us	 to	 make	 difficult	 choices,	 including	
sometimes	choices	between	goods	on	the	list.	Perhaps	a	life	with	such	a	choice	is	not	
a	great	life,	but	we	still	want	a	theory	to	tell	us	which	way	forward	is	better,	which	
choice	is	least	bad.		
	 Further	 problems	 arise	 when	 we	 ask	 ourselves	 how	 much	 of	 a	 particular	
good	 is	appropriate	 for	each	person.	 It	 is	 all	 very	well	 to	 say	 that	 friendship	 is	an	
important	 good,	 but	 how	many	 friends	 does	 a	 person	 need?	 	 Do	we	 all	 need	 the	
same	 number?	 It	 seems	 plausible	 that	 we	 do	 not.	 A	 more	 subjectively	 oriented	
theorist	 might	 try	 to	 explain	 individual	 differences	 in	 terms	 of	 psychological	
differences	(e.g.	I	am	an	introvert	whereas	you	are	an	extrovert).	But	presumably	an	
objective	 list	 theorist	 would	 not	 want	 to	 do	 that.	 Still,	 the	 question	 must	 be	
answered	somehow	 if	 the	 theory	 is	 to	be	practically	useful.	Similar	problems	arise	
with	respect	to	the	other	theories.	In	short,	the	task	of	moving	from	any	one	of	the	
big	three	to	practical	choices	is	overwhelming.	Better	to	start	closer	to	the	ground.	
	 This	 is	 not	 a	 problem	 in	 traditional	 philosophy	 classes	 since	 usually	 no	
attempt	 is	made	 there	 to	 answer	practical	 questions.	 	 Instead,	when	well-being	 is	
discussed,	the	various	theories	are	compared	and	time	is	spent	considering	various	
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objections	and	replies,	with	the	ultimate	aim	being	to	discover	which	theory	is	most	
likely	 true	 or	 which	 one	 seems	 overall	 best.	 In	 short,	 these	 are	 metaphysical	
conversations—very	 important	 metaphysical	 conversations—about	 what	 well-
being	most	 fundamentally	 is.	 There	 is	 definitely	 a	 place	 for	 such	 conversations	 in	
philosophy.	 But	 since	 we	 are	 unlikely	 to	 reach	 agreement	 on	 the	 fundamental	
metaphysics	 of	 well-being	 any	 time	 soon,	 and	 since	 these	 kinds	 of	 metaphysical	
discussions	are	not	helpful	in	practice,	what	we	need	in	practical	ethics	is	something	
different.		
	 It	is	also	worth	noting	that	many	metaphysical	details	have	little	or	no	impact	
on	practical	decisions.	To	give	just	one	example,	hedonists	maintain	that	happiness	
is	 the	 only	 intrinsic	 value,	 whereas	 other	 theories	 might	 say	 that	 happiness	 is	
intrinsically	 valuable	but	not	 the	only	 such	value,	 or	 that	 happiness	 is	 valuable	 in	
some	other	non-intrinsic	way.	But	 I	 am	not	 aware	of	 any	 theory	 that	 implies	 that	
happiness	 is	 unimportant.	 For	 example,	 desire	 theorists	 will	 only	 allow	 that	
happiness	has	intrinsic	value	if	it	is	desired.	But	given	the	overwhelming	empirical	
evidence	 that	 happiness	 is	 instrumentally	 important	 (Fredrickson	 2001;	 Bishop	
2014)—helping	us	 to	 better	 achieve	 our	 goals	whatever	 these	 are—even	 a	 desire	
theorist	must	grant	 that	happiness	matters	practically.	 	But	 if	we	can	agree	 (or	at	
least	get	much	higher	agreement)	about	the	practical	importance	of	happiness,	then	
it	is	not	really	necessary	to	settle	the	precise	kind	of	value	at	stake.		
	 Nonetheless,	 many	 philosophers	 will	 still	 think	 that	 theories	 are	 worth	 a	
look,	 even	 if	 just	 to	 familiarize	 students	 with	 the	 different	 kinds	 of	 approaches.	
However,	 there	 are	 also	 quite	 specific	 reasons	 why	 each	 of	 the	 “big	 three”	 is	
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unhelpful	 in	 a	 practical	 context.	 The	 case	 against	 objective	 list	 theories	 is	 the	
strongest,	so	I	begin	there.	But	as	I	will	try	to	show	there	are	good	reasons	to	avoid	
all	of	them.	7	
	
§2.1		Setting	Aside	Objective	Theories		
An	objective	list	theory	provides	us	with	a	list	of	(purportedly)	intrinsic	goods	and	
claims	that	the	goodness	of	these	items	for	individuals	does	not	depend	in	any	way	
on	the	attitudes	or	feelings	of	the	person	whose	welfare	is	in	question	(Parfit	1984,	
493).8	If,	for	example,	possessing	knowledge	is	on	the	list	of	goods,	then	regardless	
of	whether	I	want,	value,	or	enjoy	possessing	knowledge	the	list	theory	claims	that	I	
am	better	off	having	it.	Objective	 list	 theories	so	defined	make	two	claims	that	are	
worth	distinguishing:	(1)	the	claim	that	our	attitudes	and/or	feelings	are	not	what	
makes	something	good,	and	(2)	the	claim	that	something	could	be	good	for	us	even	if	
we	 have	 no	 positive	 reaction	 of	 any	 kind	 to	 it.	 As	 I	 see	 it,	 objective	 list	 theories	
should	be	 left	out	of	practically	oriented	discussions	of	welfare	because	 their	 first	
																																																								
7	Some	readers	may	note	that	the	following	discussion	of	well-being	theories	does	not	go	into	much	
depth	and	rehearses	certain	objections	 that	are	extremely	well	known.	However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	
remember	 the	 current	 aim.	 The	 aim	 is	 not	 to	 show	 that	 simple	 versions	 of	 these	 theories	 fail	
(something	most	philosophers	already	know),	but	to	demonstrate	that	such	theories	are	extremely	
unlikely	to	offer	useful	practical	guidance.		
	
8	Perfectionist	 theories	were	 not	 discussed	 by	 Parfit	 or	 Griffin,	 but	 in	 recent	 years	 there	 has	 been	
renewed	interest	in	perfectionism.	However,	all	of	the	concerns	I	express	about	objective	list	theories	
apply	 equally	 to	 perfectionist	 theories.	 For	 an	 overview	 of	 perfectionist	 views	 of	 well-being	 see	
Bradford	(2017).	
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distinctive	claim	(about	what	makes	something	good	for	someone)	is	irrelevant	for	
practical	 ethics	 and	 because	 their	 second	 distinctive	 claim	 (about	 there	 being	 no	
need	for	positive	reactions	on	the	part	of	the	subject),	though	highly	relevant,	is	far	
too	controversial	to	be	accepted	on	the	basis	of	the	thin	justifications	objective	list	
theories	can	offer.	9	
	 The	 first	 claim—about	 what	 makes	 something	 good—is	 heatedly	 debated	
among	philosophers	and	is	really	just	a	version	of	the	ancient	Euthyphro	debate:	is	
something	good	because	we	like	it	or	value	it,	or	do	we	like	it	or	value	it	(assuming	
we	 do)	 because	 it	 is	 good?	 Is	 goodness	 created	 by	 our	 attitudes	 or	 is	 it	 entirely	
independent	of	them?	Though	it	is	an	interesting	question,	it	need	not	be	answered	
before	we	do	practical	ethics.	After	all,	if	we	can	agree	that	some	particular	item	X	is	
good	 for	a	particular	subject	S,	and	 that	S	values	or	 likes	X,	 then	 it	hardly	matters	
whether	it	is	good	because	she	likes	it,	or	whether	she	likes	it	because	it	is	good.		
	 	The	second	distinctive	claim	of	objective	list	theorists	is	a	rejection	of	what	
contemporary	philosophers	call	“resonance,”	i.e.	the	idea	that	in	order	for	something	
																																																								
9	Like	me,	Haybron	and	Tiberius	(2015)	set	aside	objective	theories,	in	their	case	within	the	realm	of	
public	policy.	Their	reasons,	however,	are	rather	different	from	mine.	Their	“pragmatic	subjectivism”	
is	 based	 on	 the	 idea	 that	 respect	 for	 persons	 requires	 policy	 makers	 to	 remain	 neutral	 between	
theories	of	well-being	and	simply	attend	to	what	individuals	see	as	good	for	themselves.	So	stated	it	
seems	perilously	close	to	the	simple	equation	of	welfare	with	current	values	that	I	seek	to	challenge	
within	the	context	of	medicine.	The	difference	may	simply	be	that	I	focus	on	more	intimate	contexts	
and	on	decision-making	for	individuals.	In	these	settings	it	is	important	to	distinguish	the	before	and	
after	of	decision-making—what	a	person	believes	will	be	good	for	her	ex	ante	and	what	really	is	good	
for	her	ex	post.	Such	distinctions	don’t	figure	much	in	their	article,	but	this	is	probably	because	for	the	
purposes	 of	 large-scale	 public	 policy,	 they	 aren’t	 as	 important.	 Hall	 (2016)	 also	 rejects	 appeal	 to		
objective	list	theories	in	medicine,	for	reasons	similar	to	Haybron	and	Tiberius.		
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to	be	good	for	a	person	it	must	have	some	sort	of	positive	psychological	effect	on	the	
individual	in	question.	Rejection	of	resonance	is	highly	controversial,	and	indeed,	is	
the	reason	most	often	given	for	rejecting	objective	list	theories.	Many	people	simply	
cannot	 fathom	how	something	 could	be	 good	 for	 an	 individual	 if	 it	 does	not	now,	
and	 is	unlikely	ever	 in	 the	 future,	 to	resonate	with	her	 in	any	way.	Peter	Railton’s	
expression	of	this	thought	has	by	now	become	canonical:	“It	would	be	an	intolerably	
alienated	conception	of	someone’s	good	 to	 imagine	 that	 it	might	 fail	 in	any	way	 to	
engage	him”	(Railton	1986,	9).	And	Shelly	Kagan	(2009)	has	expressed	it	forcefully	
in	 relation	 to	objective	 list	 theories:	 “friends	of	 an	objective	account	of	well-being	
seem	 forced	 to	 accept	 the	 unappealing	 claim	 that	 I	 could	 be	 extremely	 well	 off,	
provided	that	 I	have	the	right	objective	goods	 in	my	 life,	even	though	these	things	
hold	no	appeal	for	me,	and	I	am,	in	fact,	utterly	miserable.”	
	 	It	 is	 important	 to	 recognize	 that	 resonance	 is	 not	 just	 a	 philosopher’s	
metaphysical	 principle.	 In	 ordinary	 life,	 resonance	 plays	 an	 incredibly	 important	
epistemic	role	in	judgments	about	what	is	good	for	an	individual.	This	epistemic	role	
is	 admittedly	 subtle.	We	 do	 not	 (and	 should	 not)	 assume	 that	 resonance	 alone	 is	
indicative	 of	 personal	 goodness	 (though	 the	 fact	 that	 something	 resonates	 with	
someone	may	 lead	 us	 to	 inquire	 further	 about	 its	 goodness	 or	 suitability	 for	 that	
person).	Rather,	the	epistemic	role	of	resonance	is	negative:	those	things	that	do	not	
resonate	at	all	are	those	we	feel	most	certain	are	not	good.		
	 If	we	allow	objective	list	theories	to	play	a	role	in	practical	ethics,	then	we	are	
in	essence	allowing	that	there	may	be	cases	where	we	are	willing	to	say	X	is	good	for	
S	despite	complete	 lack	of	 resonance.	But	 it	 seems	 to	me	 that	 if	we	 throw	out	 the	
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resonance	 requirement,	 even	 for	 certain	 cases,	 we	must	 have	 some	 other	 equally	
powerful	epistemic	indicator	of	what	is	or	is	not	good	for	a	particular	individual	and	
that	 the	burden	of	producing	such	an	 indicator	 lies	with	 the	objective	 list	 theorist	
who	wishes	 to	 employ	 his	 theory	 in	 the	 practical	 realm.	 Yet	 it	 is	 precisely	 in	 the	
realm	 of	 epistemic	 justification	 that	 objective	 list	 theories	 of	 welfare	 have	 been,	
traditionally,	 most	 vulnerable.	 At	 present,	 such	 views	 contain	 no	 satisfactory	
account	 of	 how	we	 come	 to	 know	 that	 particular	 things	 are	 objectively	 good,	 and	
likewise	no	account	of	how	we	can	reliably	distinguish	false	goods	from	true	ones.	
We	have	nothing	more	than	the	claims	and	assertions	of	different	theorists	who	are	
drawn	to	the	objective	list	account.		
	 In	response,	a	defender	of	objective	list	views	might	agree	that	we	should	not	
base	 real	 life	 practical	 decisions	 on	 unusual	 claims—items	 claimed	 to	 be	 good	 by	
only	one	version	of	list	theory,	or	a	version	accepted	by	only	a	few	theorists.	But,	it	
might	 be	 argued,	 certain	 items	 have	 appeared	 over	 and	 over	 again	 over	 time	 on	
most	versions	of	 list	theories.	That	these	items	really	are	welfare	goods	is	thus	far	
more	plausible,	and	this	very	fact	of	widespread	acceptance	can	do	the	justificatory	
work.		
	 However,	when	 it	 comes	 to	 individual	welfare,	 such	 an	 answer	will	 not	 do.	
Welfare	facts	vary	in	subtle	and	not-so-subtle	ways	from	person	to	person.	What	we	
need	is	not	a	reason	to	believe	X	is	good	for	most	people,	but	a	reason	to	believe	that	
X	 is	good	 for	a	particular	person	at	a	particular	 time.	And	the	challenging	case	we	
are	considering	is	one	where	the	person	in	question	has	no	current	positive	reaction	
to	X	and,	as	best	we	can	tell,	is	unlikely	to	develop	any.	One	possible	explanation	for	
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what	 is	going	on	 in	such	a	case	 is	 that	 the	objective	 list	 theory	 is	 true,	X	 is	 indeed	
good	 for	 S,	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 resonance	 is	 insignificant.	 But	 an	 equally	 plausible	
explanation	 is	 that	objective	 list	 theory	 is	 false,	X	 is	not	good	 for	S	and	the	 lack	of	
resonance	is	indicative	of	this.	The	surface	plausibility	of	the	claim	that	X	is	good	for	
S	 also	 has	 two	 possible	 sources.	 It	 might	 stem	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 X	 is	 good	 for	
everyone	or	from	the	fact	that	X	is	good	for	many	people	in	many	situations.	But	if	it	
stems	from	the	second,	we	still	have	no	basis	for	concluding	it	is	good	for	S	in	this	
situation.	 The	 objective	 list	 theory	 lacks	 the	 resources	 to	 distinguish	 such	 cases.	
Such	 theorists	 in	 effect	 tell	 us	 to	 ignore	 one	 very	 powerful	 and	 widely	 accepted	
epistemic	indicator	(one	that	is	saying	this	is	not	good	for	S)	and	yet	fail	to	offer	any	
other	justification	that	can	establish	a	positive	link	between	X	and	S.	That	is	why	it	
should	be	set-aside	for	practical	purposes.		
	 		
§2.2		Setting	Aside	Desire	Theories		
Desire	theories	of	well-being	equate	what	is	good	for	a	person	with	the	satisfaction	
of	 her	 desires:	 it	 is	 good	 for	 you	 to	 get	 what	 you	 want.	 Desire	 theories	 come	 in	
several	forms,	but	the	primary	problem	stems	from	the	fact	that	desire	is	generally	
understood	to	be	a	prospective	attitude,	by	which	I	mean	that	desire	is	for	something	
I	do	not	yet	have.	In	some	cases,	a	desire	for	X	will	be	satisfied	almost	as	soon	as	it	
forms,	ensuring	that	the	time	between	desire	formation	and	satisfaction	is	small.	In	
other	cases,	I	may	desire	something	that	I	cannot	hope	to	attain	for	a	long	time.	The	
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important	point	 is	 simply	 that	 some	 temporal	gap,	whether	 large	or	 small,	 always	
exists.10		
	 Some	theorists	will	respond	that	the	theory	need	not,	and	indeed	should	not,	
be	interpreted	so	narrowly	because	‘desire’	need	not	be	only	prospective.	Moreover,	
a	 theory	 limited	 to	 prospective	 attitudes	would	 be	 implausible,	 since	 it	would	 be	
unable	 to	 account	 for	 the	 value	 of	 unexpected	 benefits—“manna	 from	heaven”	 as	
James	Griffin	puts	it.	(Griffin,	1986,	22).		So	we	should	take	any	reasonable	version	
of	 desire	 theory	 to	 include	both	 desires	 in	 the	 prospective	 sense	 as	well	 as	many	
occurrent	attitudes.	My	point,	however,	 is	 less	about	how	we	use	the	term	 ‘desire’	
and	 more	 about	 problems	 that	 remain	 for	 any	 theory	 that	 includes	 prospective	
attitudes.	 As	 long	 as	 prospective	 attitudes	 remain	 a	 part	 of	 one’s	 view,	 serious	
problems	(of	the	sort	described	below)	will	continue	to	arise.	And	if	one	is	willing	to	
formulate	a	theory	entirely	in	terms	of	occurrent	attitudes	then	I	see	little	reason	to	
cling	 to	 the	word	 “desire”	 (For	 surely	desire	 can	be	prospective).	 	 Still,	 to	be	 fully	
clear,	if	someone	does	so,	then	his	theory	is	not	in	the	category	of	theories	discussed	
here.			
	 Consider	first	actual	desire	theories	according	to	which	it	is	good	for	a	person	
if	the	desires	she	actually	has	(whatever	these	may	be	and	however	they	may	have	
arisen)	 are	 satisfied.	 The	 more	 such	 desires	 are	 satisfied	 the	 better	 off	 she	 is.	
However,	 it	 is	 widely	 acknowledged	 that	 numerous	 counterexamples	 can	 be	
																																																								
10		Sumner	(1996,	129)	emphasizes	the	prospective	nature	of	desire.	Chris	Heathwood	(2006;	2007)	
is	an	example	of	someone	who	insists	on	using	the	term	‘desire’	 in	a	broader	way	such	that	it	need	
not	be	prospective	in	nature	but	can	also	refer	to	occurrent	mental	states.	
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generated	where	 a	 person	 desires	 X	 intrinsically,	 gets	 X,	 and	 then	 is,	 by	 her	 own	
lights,	 no	 better	 off	 at	 all.	 Most	 people	 intuitively	 respond	 that	 in	 such	 a	 case	 X	
cannot	 be	 intrinsically	 good	 for	 her.	 The	 intuitions	 are	 so	 strong	 that	 even	 those	
attracted	to	desire	theories	generally	ignore	actual	desires.		
	 For	 this	 reason,	most	 philosophers	 interested	 in	 the	 desire	 approach	 have	
turned	their	attention	to	 informed	desires,	namely	those	based	on	information	and	
reflection.	 What	 they	 soon	 discover,	 however,	 is	 that	 any	 desire	 short	 of	 a	 fully	
informed	desire	 can	be	used	 to	generate	 counterexamples	 like	 the	ones	described	
above.	 For	 this	 reason	 most	 contemporary	 philosophers	 committed	 to	 desire	
theories	 embrace	 some	 form	 of	 the	 full	 information	 account	 of	well-being.	 And	 it	
does	 seem	 that	 if	 any	 theory	 can	 avoid	 the	 counterexamples	 produced	 by	 the	
prospective	 nature	 of	 desire,	 this	 would	 be	 it.11	However,	 it	 is	 a	 highly	 idealized	
theory	that	equates	a	person’s	good	with	the	desires	of	her	hypothetical,	 idealized	
self,	 	S+.	 	We	are	to	ask	what	S+	(who	has	all	 the	 information	there	 is	 to	have	and	
who	is	fully	rational)	would	want	for	S	if	she	were	to	carefully	consider	S’s	position	
as	someone	about	to	become	S	(Railton	1986).		
	 Whatever	its	theoretical	merits,	such	a	theory	is	not	much	use	in	practice.	In	
an	attempt	to	eliminate	the	problems	arising	from	the	prospective	nature	of	desire,	
theorists	 have	 in	 effect	moved	 to	 a	 theory	 that	 closes	 the	 gap	 by	 appealing	 to	 an	
omniscient	 version	 of	 the	 self.	 But	 we	 have	 no	 way	 of	 knowing	what	 omniscient	
																																																								
11	However,	 some	 theorists	 continue	 to	 doubt	 that	 even	 the	 full	 information	 theory	will	 eliminate	
counterexamples.	For	critical	discussions	of	this	theory	see	Rosati	(1995)	and	Sobel	(1994).	
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beings	 would	 want.	 And	 so	 we	 cannot	 appeal	 to	 such	 a	 theory	 to	 help	 us	 in	
particular	cases.				
	 Many	 theorists,	however,	 are	 confident	 that	 there	will	not	usually	be	much	
difference	between	an	 individual’s	highly	 idealized	desires	 (the	desires	of	S+)	and	
what	 I	 shall	 call	 her	 “reasonably	 informed	 desires.”	 A	 person	 has	 “reasonably	
informed	desires”	 if	 she	possesses	a	 reasonable	amount	of	 the	 information	 that	 is	
both	available	in	her	world	and	relevant	to	her	current	choice	situation,	and	if	her	
desires	 reflect	 this	 information.	Unlike	 fully	 informed	desires	 (which	no	one	has),	
many	of	us	have	reasonably	informed	desires	and	in	other	cases	we	can	guess	what	
such	desires	would	be	simply	by	imagining	a	few	simple	fixes	to	the	actual	desires.		
If	 it	were	true	that	the	two	sets	of	desires	overlapped	significantly,	then	one	could	
appeal	 to	 reasonably	 informed	 desires	 as	 epistemic	 guides.	 Something	 like	 this	
mode	 of	 thinking	 may	 explain	 why	 some	 theorists	 are	 comfortable	 assuming	
something	like	welfare	subjectivism*	in	practical	contexts.	However,	it	is	important	
to	remember	 that	even	 if	 reasonably	 informed	desires	are	often	good	guides,	 they	
are	not	always	so,	and	we	have	no	obvious	ways	of	knowing	when	the	two	diverge.	
More	importantly,	however,	there	are	good	reasons	for	doubting	that	the	two	sets	of	
desires	overlap	as	much	as	some	people	believe.					
	 In	 recent	 decades	 psychology	 has	 done	 much	 to	 undermine	 confidence	 in	
even	 “reasonably	 informed”	 choice.	 We	 are	 now	 more	 aware	 than	 ever	 of	 the	
multiple	forms	of	irrationality	to	which	all	of	us	are	prone	(Kahneman	2011;	Ariely	
2013;	Thaler	2008).	Moreover,	important	work	on	affective	forecasting	(our	ability	
to	predict	our	own	future	emotions)	has	emphasized	just	how	bad	most	of	us	are	at	
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imagining	 how	 we	 will	 feel	 in	 novel	 situations	 (Gilbert	 2006).	 We	 are	 thus	
particularly	bad	at	making	decisions	in	those	cases	where	all	of	our	options	lead	us	
into	unfamiliar	territory.	Yet	it	is	significant	that	the	choices	that	confront	seriously	
ill	people	are	often	precisely	of	this	form.	Rather	than	fall	into	the	habit	of	assuming	
that	people	are	well	off	as	long	as	they	get	what	they	want	(or	what	they	want	when	
reasonably	 informed),	we	ought	 instead	 to	be	in	the	habit	of	asking	how	likely	they	
really	are	to	benefit	if	they	get	what	they	want.		
	 Thus,	 as	with	 other	 theories,	 introducing	 students	 to	 desire	 theories	when	
we	 are	 interested	 in	 practical	 questions	 is	 typically	 unhelpful.	 Moreover,	 in	 the	
worst	 case	 it	 may	 actually	 serve	 to	 reinforce	 a	 way	 of	 thinking	 about	 the	
relationship	 between	 personal	 choice	 and	 welfare	 that,	 at	 least	 in	 the	 medical	
context,	is	not	ideal.					
	
§	2.3		Setting	Aside	Hedonism	
If	we	set	aside	discussion	of	other	over-arching	theories	there	is	hardly	much	reason	
left	to	retain	discussion	of	hedonism	as	a	theory.	In	my	experience,	although	people	
may	 be	 initially	 drawn	 to	 it,	when	 forced	 to	 think	 about	 the	 details,	most	 quickly	
reject	it.	Most	people	continue,	however,	to	see	happiness	as	important,	even	if	it	is	
not	 the	 only	 intrinsic	 value	 as	 hedonism	 claims.12 		 But	 given	 agreement	 that	
																																																								
12	It	 is	 important	 to	 distinguish	 the	 use	 of	 the	 term	 “happiness”	 as	 an	 evaluative	 term,	 roughly	
equivalent	to	“well-being,”	and	use	of	the	term	in	a	purely	descriptive,	psychological	sense	that	leaves	
open	the	relationship	between	happiness	and	well-being.	I	only	use	“happiness”	in	the	second	sense.	
For	 a	 detailed	 explanation	 of	 the	 difference	 and	 a	 defense	 of	 using	 the	 term	 psychologically	 see	
Haybron	(2008,	29-42).	
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happiness	matters,	rather	than	spend	time	debating	whether	it	 is	the	only	 intrinsic	
good,	it	makes	more	sense	to	explore	what	happiness	is	in	an	attempt	to	move	past	
superficial	understandings	of	it.		
	 Not	only	does	happiness	matter,	but	other	things	do	as	well,	and	it	does	not	
take	 theories	 to	 get	people	 to	 see	 this.	Most	people	 are	 familiar	with	 cases	where	
individuals	voluntarily	choose	that	which	will	make	them	less	happy	and	where	they	
do	 so	 for	 apparently	 self-interested	 reasons	 (for	 example,	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 some	
personal	achievement).	And	reflection	on	such	cases	typically	leads	people	to	accept	
that	there	could	be	good	choices	that	do	not	necessarily	maximize	future	happiness.	
	 	
§3.0			Theory-Without-Theories	
What,	 then,	 is	 left?	Given	 the	way	many	people	 think	 about	well-being,	 and	 given	
what	I	have	said	so	far,	it	may	seem	that	there	is	not	much	left	to	discuss	or	teach.	
But	that	would	be	premature.	Philosophy	and	philosophical	modes	of	thinking	can	
do	more	than	simply	articulate	and	defend	over-arching	theories.	In	what	follows	I	
introduce	 the	 theory-without-theories	 approach	which	 has	 two	main	 components:	
(1)	an	examination	of	certain	relatively	uncontroversial	elements	of	welfare	and	(2)	
a	 structural	 framework	 for	 thinking	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	 particular	
choices	and	well-being.	
	
§2.1		Illuminating	Well-Being	Goods	and	Bads		
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There	 are	 some	welfare	 values	 (and	 disvalues)	 that	 are	widely	 accepted	 as	 such.	
Indeed,	 they	 are	 so	 widely	 accepted	 that	 we	 can,	 for	 practical	 purposes,	 move	
forward	with	 the	 assumption	 that	 these	 things	matter,	 and	we	 can	 do	 so	without	
resolving	 precise	 questions	 about	 how	 much	 they	 matter,	 whether	 they	 matter	
equally,	 whether	 they	 are	 the	 only	 things	 that	 matter,	 or	 whether	 they	 matter	
instrumentally,	 intrinsically,	 or	 both.	 The	 two	 positive	 values	 that	 fall	 in	 this	
category	 are	 psychological	 happiness	 and	 what	 I	 shall	 here	 call	 “evaluative	
engagement,”	 which	 is	 active,	 successful	 engagement	 with	 the	 people	 and/or	
projects	one	cares	a	great	deal	about.	The	one	disvalue	we	can	be	 sure	matters	 is	
suffering,	 where	 I	 take	 the	word	 to	 indicate	 the	more	 extreme	 forms	 of	 negative	
experience,	 including	 both	 extreme	 physical	 pain	 and	 extreme	mental/	 emotional	
distress.		
	 By	itself,	the	announcement	that	these	three	things	are	significant	may	strike	
readers	 as	 trivial.	 But	 even	 if	 most	 people	 accept	 that	 these	 things	 matter,	 most	
people	 have	 not	 spent	 much	 time	 thinking	 about	 what	 these	 things	 are,	 and	 the	
various	ways	 in	which	 they	matter.	 I	 wish	 to	 argue	 that	 there	 is	 practical	 ethical	
value	to	be	found	in	reflection	on	the	nature	of	these	three.	Traditionally,	philosophy	
has	 not	 just	 been	 known	 as	 a	 discipline	 devoted	 to	 constructing	 theories,	 but	 has	
also	been	known	for	its	attention	to	and	analysis	of	mid-level	concepts	or	ideas,	the	
kind	of	 ideas	that	play	 important	roles	within	theories.	Thus	one	thing	philosophy	
(here	 construed	 broadly)	 can	 do	 for	medical	 ethics	 is	 to	 help	 us	move	 towards	 a	
deeper	 understanding	 of	 what	 happiness,	 suffering,	 and	 evaluative	 engagement	
really	are,	and	why	they	matter.		
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	 Consider	happiness	first.	Precisely	because	most	ordinary	people	find	it	hard	
to	define	happiness,	it	can	be	incredibly	helpful	to	introduce	them	to	theories	of	its	
nature.	In	doing	so	we	make	it	easier	for	them	to	articulate	the	value	of	happiness	
and	of	positive	psychological	states	more	generally.	 In	ordinary	thought	happiness	
is	often	just	defined	as	a	“good	feeling.”	This	in	turn	lends	support	to	the	claim	made	
by	 some	 theorists	 that	 psychological	 happiness	 is	 a	 trivial	 or	 shallow	 affair,	 not	
really	worthy	of	our	attention	(Annas	2004).	But	there	is	much	more	to	happiness	
than	such	critics	allow.	One	of	the	important	lessons	of	philosophical	psychology	is	
that	 complex	 psychological	 states	 like	 happiness	 incorporate	 elements	 of	 both	
emotion	and	thought.	To	be	happy	is	not	just	to	experience	simple	pleasure.	To	be	
happy	 is	 to	 have	 a	 certain	 (largely	 positive)	 outlook	 on	 life.	 On	 some	 views	 the	
defining	aspect	of	this	outlook	is	a	judgment,	for	example	the	judgment	that	overall	
my	life	is	going	well	and	living	up	to	my	standards	(Sumner	1996).	On	other	views,	
happiness	 is	 primarily	 an	 emotional	 phenomenon,	 but	 one	 with	 many	 complex	
influences	on	our	thinking	(Haybron	2008).		
	 Reflection	also	helps	us	to	see	that	happiness	is	most	likely	valuable	in	more	
than	one	 sense.	 It	 is	 plausible	 that	 it	 has	 intrinsic	 value	 (we	all	want	 to	be	happy	
independently	of	whether	this	has	other	good	effects).	But	contemporary	research	
also	supports	the	idea	that	happiness	is	a	significant	instrumental	good,	enabling	us	
to	better	realize	our	goals	(Fredrickson	2001;	Bishop	2014).	By	introducing	people	
to	discussions	about	happiness,	we	can	improve	their	thinking	about	welfare.		
	 Consider	next,	 evaluative	 engagement.	 People	understand	 instinctively	 that	
our	 values	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 our	 lives.	 The	 values	 that	 matter	 most	 for	
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discussions	 of	 welfare	 are	 those	 that	 shape	my	 daily	 life.	 My	 personal	 welfare	 is	
enhanced	by	my	interactions	with	particular	people—those	I	love	and	who	love	me,	
those	I	learn	from,	those	I	help,	those	I	am	friends	with,	and	those	who	challenge	me	
in	various	ways.	And	similarly	my	welfare	is	enhanced	by	my	participation	in	certain	
projects	and	my	pursuit	of	particular	goals.	But	most	people	have	not	thought	much	
about	the	ways	in	which	realizing	values	over	time	can	cause	problems.13	Our	values	
can	 sometimes	 conflict	with	one	another	 in	ways	we	 fail	 to	 see.	And	we	 can	have	
values	that	fail	to	‘fit’	with	our	personality	and	so	are	unlikely	to	lead	us	in	fulfilling	
directions.	Thinking	about	such	issues	can	deepen	our	appreciation	of	what	we	are	
aiming	 for	when	we	aim	to	 live	well,	and	more	particularly	when	we	aim	to	make	
welfare	enhancing	choices.14		
	 Finally,	 consider	 suffering.	 It	 is	 no	 surprise	 that	 suffering	 should	be	 on	 the	
menu	 of	 items	 to	 discuss	 in	medical	 ethics.	 But	 despite	 knowing	 that	 suffering	 is	
bad,	many	people	remain	unsure	how	to	describe	the	difference	between	emotional	
and	physical	suffering,	and	fail	to	appreciate	the	fact	that,	in	addition	to	feeling	bad,	
suffering	keeps	us	from	appreciating	and	interacting	with	other	things	of	value.	Yet	
understanding	 the	 true	 disvalue	 of	 suffering	 requires	 understanding	 the	 many	
different	 ways	 it	 can	 undermine	 a	 person	 and	 her	 relationships	 to	 people	 and	
																																																								
13	To	date	the	most	in-depth	exploration	of	the	way	values	come	together	(or	not)	to	inform	a	good	
life	is	Tiberius	(2018).	
		
14	Many	 philosophers	 in	 one	 way	 or	 another	 address	 the	 importance	 of	 engaging	 values	 for	 good	
lives.	A	few	examples	are	Kraut	(1994);	Darwall	(2002);	Raibley	(2010)	and	(2013).	To	some	extent	
the	philosophical	literature	on	meaning	in	life	also	contributes.	See,	e.g.	Wolf	(2010);	and	Kauppinen	
(2012),	(2015).			
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projects.	It	is	also	useful	to	consider	reflectively	the	kinds	of	claims	one	sometimes	
encounters	about	 the	value	of	 suffering,	 for	 it	 is	 sometimes	 claimed	 that	 suffering	
has	 a	 kind	 of	 positive	 instrumental	 value.15	This	 is	 the	 theme	 of	 many	 popular	
medical	 biographies:	 “I	 got	 cancer,	 and	 then	 I	 learned	 what	 really	 matters”).	 But	
what	precisely	 is	 it	 that	some	people	“get”	 from	negative	experiences?	And	even	if	
that	 something	 is	 good,	we	must	 be	 cautious	 about	 concluding	 that	 the	 goodness	
justifies	the	pain	and	 loss	experienced.	Clearly	that	 is	not	always	true.	Finally,	 it	 is	
important	in	the	medical	context	to	think	about	the	complex	relationships	between	
physical	 pain	 and	 emotional	 distress	 (Berna	 et	 al.	 2010;	 Fishbain	 1997;	
Latremoliere	2009;	Ploghaus	2001;	Thernstrom	2010;	Cassell	1991	[2004]).	There	
is	much	about	suffering	and	its	role	in	our	lives	that	deserves	careful	reflection.16		
	
	
	
3.2	The	Mild	Objectivity	Framework		
In	addition	 to	examining	elements	of	welfare,	 there	 is	a	second,	equally	 important	
part	 of	 the	 theory-without-theories	 approach.	We	need,	 in	 addition,	what	 I	 call	 the	
“mild-objectivity	 framework,”	 which	 is	 best	 presented	 as	 four	 inter-related	
																																																								
15	For	critical	discussions	of	this	idea	see	Haidt	(2007)	and	Hawkins	(2018).	
	
16	Philosophers	 in	 the	 analytic	 tradition	have	written	 a	 great	deal	 about	pain	 and	 significantly	 less	
about	 suffering.	But	 there	 is	 still	much	 that	 is	 important.	On	pain	see	Kahane	 (2016:	209-220).	On	
suffering	more	generally,	see	e.g.	Carel	(2008);	Green	and	Palpant	(2014);	Kauppinen	(forthcoming);	
Hawkins	(unpublished	manuscript).		
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assumptions	 to	 guide	 thinking	 about	 specific	 cases.	 These	 four	 are	 (1)	 mild-
objectivity,	 (2)	 epistemic	 humility,	 (3)	 future	 truth-makers,	 and	 (4)	 death	 as	
deprivation.	
	 First	 is	 the	 assumption	 of	 “mild	 objectivity.”	 Here	 I	 do	 not	 mean	 what	
objective	 list	 theorists	mean—I	am	not	 invoking	 the	 idea	of	 value	 that	 is	 strongly	
mind-independent	and/or	independent	of	subject	resonance.	 	Here	the	description	
of	the	topic	area	as	‘objective’	just	signals	that	there	is	room	for	error.	In	any	domain	
where	claims	can	be	 true	or	 false,	 and	where	human	beings	do	not	have	 infallible	
access	to	the	truth,	we	can	speak	of	objective	truth	conditions	in	this	mild	sense.	Of	
course,	 this	means	 far	 less	 than	many	people	realize	at	 first.	For	example,	one	can	
think	 that	 claims	 about	 what	 is	 good	 for	 a	 particular	 person	 are	 objective,	 even	
while	 believing	 that	 the	 truths	 in	 question	 are	 truths	 about	 the	 individual’s	
psychology	and	how	she	interacts	with	the	world	(e.g.	truths	about	what	makes	her	
happy,	what	she	values,	and	which	of	her	values	she	can	successfully	engage	with).		
There	 can	 be	 objective	 truths	 about	 subjective	 phenomena.	 Moreover,	 a	
commitment	to	mild	objectivity	is	fully	compatible	with	the	recognition	that	welfare	
facts	 are	 individually	 relative,	 as	 well	 as	 compatible	 with	 the	 recognition	 that	 in	
certain	cases	there	may	be	multiple,	equally	good	answers.		
	 All	of	this	matters,	in	turn,	because	by	adopting	a	mildly	objective	framework	
we	 can	move	 past	 a	 number	 of	 common	 confusions.	 As	mentioned	 earlier,	 many	
people	retreat	to	welfare	nihilism	when	they	are	unsure	what	to	say	about	another	
person’s	 welfare.	 Such	 a	 move	 typically	 results	 from	 confusing	 epistemic	
uncertainty	(“I	have	no	idea	what	the	answer	in	this	case	is”)	with	the	metaphysical	
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claim	 that	 there	 is	 no	 answer	 to	 be	 had	 or	 that	 all	 answers	 are	 equal.	 The	 mild	
objectivity	 framework	 substitutes	 instead	 the	metaphysical	 assumption	 that	 there	
are	answers,	 i.e.	 better	 and	worse	outcomes	 from	 the	 standpoint	of	 the	 subject	 in	
question.	But	it	also	adds	epistemic	humility,	namely	an	acknowledgment	of	the	fact	
that	 it	 is	often	incredibly	hard	to	know	what	the	 likely	possible	outcomes	are,	and	
therefore	incredibly	hard	to	know	what	a	good	choice	would	be.			
	 Another	equally	common	reaction	to	uncertainty	is	to	retreat	to	the	idea	that	
an	 individual	cannot	be	wrong	about	her	own	good	(simple	welfare	subjectivism).	
But	this	confuses	the	thought	that	the	subject	 is	the	authority	on	all	aspects	of	her	
own	good	(which	is	clearly	not	true)	with	the	idea	that	truth	in	this	domain	depends	
on	 subjective	 features	 of	 the	 person.	 That	 subjects	 can	 make	 mistakes	 seems	
obvious	as	soon	as	we	begin	to	think	about	the	ways	in	which	even	a	single	person	
can	change	her	assessment	of	what	is	good	for	her	over	time,	and	how	individuals	
themselves	 often	 view	 their	 former	 selves	 as	 mistaken.	 The	 mild	 objectivity	
framework	 emphasizes	 that	 the	 possibility	 of	 mistake	 is	 compatible	 with	 the	
thought	that	the	truth	makers	of	welfare	claims	depend	on	subjective	features	of	the	
individual	in	question.		
	 This	is	the	relevance	of	the	third	principle:	“future	based	truth	makers.”	The	
idea	here	is	that	whether	or	not	something	is	good	for	us	depends	not	on	what	we	
value	or	want	when	making	choices,	but	on	how	the	 “thing”	 in	question	affects	us	
once	we	“have”	it	or	once	it	enters	our	life.	Moreover,	we	want	to	assess	the	relative	
good	and	bad	effects	of	different	options.	In	short,	when	we	make	significant	welfare	
choices,	we	 are	making	 our	 best	 guess	 about	 the	 relative	 value	 for	 the	 subject	 of	
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possible	futures.	And	it	is	because	we	can	so	easily	be	mistaken	about	the	value	for	a	
person	of	future	options	that	we	can	so	easily	make	poor	choices.		
	 Mild	objectivity	(the	over-arching	framework	of	four	principles)	tells	us	that	
if	a	person	 faces	a	choice	between	A	and	B,	 then	 in	order	 to	know	what	would	be	
best	for	her,	we	need	to	know	how	she	would	feel	about	and/or	react	to	living	the	
life	that	comes	with	choice	A,	as	well	as	how	she	would	feel	about	and/or	react	to	
living	the	life	that	comes	with	choice	B.		The	better	choice	is	the	one	that	will	have	
the	 greatest	 net	 value	 for	 her	 when	 she	 lives	 it.	 In	 keeping	 with	 the	 earlier	
discussion	of	welfare	values,	we	would	ask	questions	like	this:	How	much	happiness	
(if	any)	is	likely	to	come	from	each	option?	How	much	and	what	type	of	evaluative	
engagement?	And	how	much	pain	or	suffering	is	likely	to	come	from	each	option	(if	
any)?	The	best	choice	is	the	one	that,	as	best	we	can	tell	on	the	basis	of	our	evidence,	
leads	to	the	future	with	the	greatest	net	value	for	the	individual.17	
	 Of	course,	in	a	great	many	cases	we	do	not	have	enough	information	to	make	
fine-grained	distinctions	 among	possible	 options.	Moreover,	 the	 framework	 is	 not	
designed	 to	 enable	 us	 to	 do	 so	 even	 in	 theory.	 But	 we	 do	 not	 need	 such	 precise	
judgments.	What	we	want	 and	what	 the	 framework	 offers	 us	 is	 a	way	 to	 identify	
cases	where	it	seems	that	someone	is	about	to	choose	something	that	will	be	much	
worse	 for	 her	 than	 other	 available	 alternatives.	 This	 is	 sufficient	 in	 the	 context	 of	
clinical	medicine,	since	it	is	only	when	a	patient’s	choice	appears	to	be	quite	bad	and	
avoidably	so	that	 it	makes	sense	to	converse	more	about	the	options,	and	perhaps	
																																																								
17	I	have	discussed	issues	related	to	this	thesis—what	I	here	call	“future-based	truth	makers”	in	
several	other	publications.	See	Hawkins	(2014;	2019a;	2019b).	
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even	 try	 to	 rationally	 persuade	 the	patient	 to	 choose	differently.	 Thus	 if	 a	 person	
appears	to	be	making	a	choice	that	will	leave	them	much	less	happy	than	they	could	
be,	without,	 so	 far	 as	 one	 can	 see,	 any	 compensating	 gains	 in	 terms	 of	 evaluative	
engagement,	 this	 is	very	 likely	a	poor	choice.	The	reverse	 is	also	 true,	namely,	 if	a	
person	appears	to	be	choosing	something	that	will	limit	her	evaluative	engagement	
much	more	than	other	options	she	has,	with	no	apparent	compensation	in	terms	of	
increased	happiness	or	reduced	stress	etc.,	then	this	is	very	likely	a	poor	choice.	And	
finally	 if	 a	 patient	 seems	 to	 be	 choosing	 something	 that	 will	 come	 at	 the	 cost	 of	
great,	protracted	suffering	or	which	will	end	her	life,	when	there	exist	for	her	other	
options	free	of	such	suffering	and	which	contain	many	welfare	goods,	this	too	seems	
like	a	very	poor	choice	and	an	excellent	time	for	further	discussion.		
	 The	final	element	in	the	framework	is	the	deprivation	account	of	the	badness	
of	 death	 (Kagan	 1997;	 Feldman	 1992).	 I	 include	 this	 because	 students	 are	 often	
confused	 about	 how	 to	 factor	 the	 goodness	 or	 badness	 of	 death	 into	 a	 welfare	
framework.	 But	 since	 many	 cases	 discussed	 in	 bioethics	 involve	 life	 and	 death	
choices,	 it	 is	 important	 for	people	 to	have	a	way	of	conceptualizing	this.	The	basic	
idea	is	that	in	order	to	understand	when	death	is	bad	for	a	person,	we	must	compare	
the	 life	 that	 person	would	 have	 led	 if	 she	 died	 right	 now,	 and	 the	 longer	 life	 she	
would	lead	if	she	continued	to	live	longer.	If	the	net	value	of	the	longer	life	is	greater	
than	the	net	value	of	the	shorter	one,	then	it	is	better	for	the	person	not	to	die	now,	
but	to	live	out	the	additional	segment	of	life.	If	on	the	other	hand	the	net	value	of	the	
shorter	segment	is	greater,	then	death	now	is	not	really	a	harm.		
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§	3.3	Illustrating	the	Value	of	the	Theory-without-Theories	Approach	
The	mild	objectivity	framework	can	deepen	our	appreciation	of	many	types	of	cases,	
helping	us	to	think	better	than	we	do	when	we	simply	rely	on	welfare	subjectivism.		
Consider,	for	example,	cases	in	which	a	person	must	decide	whether	it	is	worthwhile	
to	re-build	a	 life	altered	 irrevocably	by	accident	or	 illness.	 In	such	cases,	exclusive	
reliance	 on	 the	 patient’s	 current	 values	 may	 not	 be	 particularly	 illuminating	 and	
may	even	be	bad.	To	see	why	consider	the	following	fictional	case.18		
	 Dave	was	an	avid	hunter	who	was	in	a	tree	one	day	watching	for	deer	when	
he	 startled	 at	 the	 sound	 of	 another	 hunter’s	 gun,	 fell	 16	 feet	 to	 the	 ground	 and	
severely	 damaged	 his	 spine.	When	 paramedics	 arrived	 they	 sedated	 him,	 and	 he	
remained	 sedated	 once	 he	 arrived	 at	 the	 hospital.	 Physicians	 quickly	 tried	 to	
determine	 the	 extent	 of	 his	 injury.	 It	 soon	 became	 clear	 that	 he	 would	 likely	 be	
paralyzed	from	the	chest	down	(a	C4	injury),19	though	it	remained	unclear	whether	
he	would	ultimately	be	ventilator	dependent.	Significantly,	however,	he	was	at	that	
moment	ventilator	dependent.		
	 Dave’s	 family	reported	that	Dave	had	always	valued	an	active	 life.	They	felt	
that	 if	 he	had	been	 asked	before	his	 accident	whether	he	would	want	 to	 live	 as	 a	
																																																								
18	Although	fictional	in	the	sense	that	I	have	filled	in	details	of	my	own	invention,	the	case	is	based	on	
a	story	reported	by	CBS	News	November	6,	2013.	Available	at	https://www.cbsnews.com/	
news/paralyzed-hunter-chooses-to-be-taken-off-life-support/.	Accessed	Monday	April	23,	2018.	
	
19	Cole	(2004)	explains	that	anyone	with	C4	injury	or	higher	is	quadraplegic,	but	that	someone	with	a	
C4	injury	“may	be	able	to	breathe	unaided	using	the	diaphragm,	though	he	or	she	will	still	have	lost	
chest	 wall	 movement	 and	 will	 have	 reduced	 expansion	 of	 the	 lungs.”	 Jonathan	 Cole,	 Still	 Lives:	
Narratives	of	Spinal	Cord	Injury	(Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press),	p.14.	
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paralyzed	person	he	would	have	said	no,	and	for	this	reason	his	family	asked	that	he	
be	removed	from	the	ventilator	and	allowed	to	die.	However,	the	doctors	involved	
rightly	insisted	that	that	had	to	be	Dave’s	choice.	What	they	did	next,	however,	was	
unusual.	They	brought	Dave	out	of	 sedation	and	asked	him	right	 then	whether	he	
wished	 to	 live	 as	 a	 paralyzed	 person.	 He	 had	 only	 been	 awake	 and	 aware	 of	 his	
diagnosis	a	short	 time	when	he	made	his	decision.	He	echoed	the	views	his	 family	
had	ascribed	to	him,	asking	to	be	taken	off	the	respirator.	Because	he	was	so	clear	
about	what	he	wanted,	the	ventilator	was	turned	off	and	he	died	very	shortly	after	
his	accident	and	only	a	few	hours	after	learning	his	diagnosis.	What	is	unusual	is	not	
that	his	wishes	were	honored	but	that	they	were	honored	so	soon	after	his	accident,	
as	well	as	the	fact	that	no	one	tried	to	educate	him	about	disability	or	explain	to	him	
what	his	life	as	a	paralyzed	individual	could	be	like.		
	 In	my	experience	many	students	are	 initially	comfortable	with	the	outcome	
of	this	case.	When	pushed	to	say	why,	they	cite	the	fact	that	he	acted	on	values	he	
had	had	 for	a	 long	 time.	When	 the	possibility	of	mistake	 is	 raised	 they	are	at	 first	
skeptical	that	any	mistake	could	exist	here.		
	 However,	 there	 are	 good	 reasons	 in	 this	 case	 for	 thinking	 that	Dave	 chose	
badly	 even	 though	 he	 got	 exactly	 what	 he	 asked	 for.	 There	 is	 much	 empirical	
evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 although	 people	 with	 severe	 spinal	 cord	 injury	 initially	
want	to	die	or	feel	despairing	about	the	future,	they	go	on	(once	they	adapt	a	bit)	to	
value	their	lives.	The	empirical	evidence	for	this	is	amazingly	strong	(Chwalisz	et	al.,	
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1988;	 Lundqvist	 et	 al,	 1991;	 Cushman	&	Hassett,	 1992;	Whiteneck	 et	 al,	 1992).20	
Since	all	of	the	paralyzed	individuals	in	the	studies	cited	here	once	thought	as	Dave	
did,	 the	 mere	 fact	 that	 he	 valued	 active	 life	 at	 the	 time	 of	 his	 accident	 and	 was	
convinced	that	he	could	not	be	happy	as	a	paralyzed	person	is	not	sufficient	to	tell	
us	 whether	 that	 is	 true.	 The	 evidence	 we	 have	 suggests	 that	 Dave	 is	 very	 likely	
making	 a	 mistake.	 However,	 epistemic	 humility	 requires	 us	 to	 also	 acknowledge	
that	Dave	is	an	individual	and	we	simply	don’t	know	how	he	might	have	felt	had	he	
lived	longer.			
	 Importantly,	 in	 the	 process	 of	 thinking	 about	 the	 case,	 students	 generally	
shift	their	sense	of	what	would	convince	them	of	the	truth	of	various	claims.		They	
come	to	appreciate	that	what	matters	is	not	what	Dave	says	when	he	wakes	up,	but	
what	would	actually	have	happened	if	he	had	lived.	They	come	to	think	in	terms	of		
“future	 based	 truth	 makers.”	 Some	 students	 remain	 convinced	 that	 Dave’s	
personality	(as	revealed	by	what	we	know	of	his	actions	and	values)	is	such	that	he	
really	 could	 not	 have	 been	 happy	 as	 a	 disabled	 person.	 But	 even	 these	 students	
typically	grant	that	his	choice	would	be	a	prudential	mistake	if	it	were	true	that	if	he	
had	lived	he	would	have	derived	significant	benefit	from	his	extended	life.			
																																																								
20	The	 citations	 in	 the	 text	 report	no	 relevant	difference	 in	well-being	between	 spinal	 cord	 injured	
(SCI)	persons	 and	non-disabled	 controls.	Other	 studies	have	 found	 lower	quality	of	 life	 among	SCI	
persons,	but	interestingly	only	a	little	lower	(P.	Brickman,	et.	al.	1978;	R.	Schulz	&	S.	Decker,	1985;	R.	
Stensman,	1994;	M.	Kannisto	&	H.	Sintonen,	1997;	Marcel	Dijkers,	1997).	Furthermore,	many	other	
studies	 support	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 primary	 explanations	 of	 differences	 are	 social	 and	 not	 degree	 of	
impairment	(R.	Schulz	&	S.	Decker,	1985;	Chase	et	al.,	2000;	I.	Ville	&	J.F.	Ravaud,	2001).	
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	 My	 aim	 in	 teaching	 the	 case	 is	 not	 to	 convince	 students	 that	 Dave	make	 a	
mistake.	 Rather,	 I	want	 them	 to	 take	 seriously	 the	 idea	 that	 there	 are	 better	 and	
worse	outcomes,	and	that	therefore	mistake	is	a	real	possibility.	I	also	want	them	to	
think	about	 the	kinds	of	 evidence	 that	might	 support	one	or	another	view	of	how	
things	might	go,	and	to	see	that	at	 least	sometimes	the	evidence	points	strongly	in	
one	direction	or	another.	This	matters	because	once	 they	accept	 the	possibility	of	
error,	they	see	that	much	more	could	and	should	be	done	in	a	case	like	Dave’s	before	
simply	acquiescing	with	his	wish	to	die.	Ultimately,	of	course,	the	choice	is	his.	But	
someone	 should	 at	 least	 talk	 to	 him	 about	 it	 once	 he	 is	 no	 longer	 in	 shock.	 And	
someone	 should	 educate	 him	 about	 his	 disability	 and	 how	 others	 with	 similar	
disabilities	live.	In	short,	framing	the	situation	in	mildly	objective	terms	changes	the	
way	students	see	the	conversational	obligations	of	healthcare	providers.			
	 As	 a	 further	 illustration	 of	 the	 power	 of	 the	 framework,	 consider	 a	 very	
different	 case	 described	 by	 Atul	 Gawande	 in	 his	 book	 Complications	 (2002).	 In	 a	
chapter	 entitled,	 “Whose	 Body	 Is	 It	 Anyway?”	 Gawande	 sets	 out	 to	 document	 the	
radical	changes	in	medical	decision-making	that	have	occurred	since	the	1970s	and	
to	emphasize	 that	even	though	patients	are	now	in	charge,	patients	do	not	always	
choose	well.	 The	 primary	 example	 that	 runs	 through	 the	 essay	 involves	 a	 patient	
Gawande	calls	“Lazaroff.”		
	 Lazaroff	is	dying	of	cancer	and	there	is	nothing	that	can	be	done	about	it.	All	
that	is	at	issue	is	what	sorts	of	symptom-related	treatments	he	might	choose	during	
his	 last	months.	His	 legs	 are	 becoming	paralyzed	because	 of	 a	 tumor	pressing	his	
spine.	There	 is	 a	 surgery	 that	might	halt	 the	paralysis,	but	he	 is	 already	so	 fragile	
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that	he	is	highly	unlikely	to	recover	from	it.	If	he	chooses	surgery,	the	odds	are	high	
that	he	will	die	in	the	ICU	in	great	pain	and	hooked	up	to	many	machines.	To	make	
this	concrete	and	vivid	let	us	assume	that	if	he	chooses	surgery	it	is	90%	likely	that	
he	will	 either	die	 in	 surgery	or	die	 an	 ICU	death.	This	means	 there	 is	 only	 a	10%	
chance	of	Lazaroff	surviving	the	surgery,	avoiding	the	ICU,	and	going	home	to	enjoy	
his	 last	 few	months	without	paralysis.	The	alternative	 is	 to	go	home	now,	without	
surgery,	and	receive	comfort	care	allowing	the	paralysis	to	remain.	He	has	stated	in	
the	past	that	he	doesn’t	want	to	die	in	the	ICU	because	he	watched	his	wife	die	this	
way.	Yet	now	Lazaroff	chooses	surgery	and,	predictably,	he	dies	after	two	weeks	in	
the	ICU,	in	great	pain	and	hooked	up	to	many	machines.		
	 Gawande	 presents	 this	 case	 from	 the	 outset	 as	 a	 case	 of	 poor	 decision-
making.	But	what	is	interesting	is	how	he	argues	for	this.	He	is	careful	to	emphasize	
that	 Lazaroff	 had	 always	 wanted	 to	 avoid	 an	 ICU	 death.	 This	 is	 represented	 as	
Lazaroff’s	stable,	deep	desire.	Opting	for	the	surgery,	on	the	other	hand,	is	presented	
as	a	rash	decision	made	during	an	emotional	moment	(It	is	made	in	the	presence	of	
his	 son	 as	 part	 of	 an	 attempt	 not	 to	 appear	 passive,	 but	 to	 seem	 to	 be	 “doing”	
everything	possible	to	“fight”	the	illness).	If	that	is	the	right	description,	then	this	is	
a	case	where	momentary	emotion	 leads	a	person	to	act	 in	a	way	that	goes	against	
what	he	currently	values	most	and	is	thus	a	perfect	 illustration	of	the	kind	of	case	
described	by	Brock	and	Wartman.	However,	 as	with	Brock	and	Wartman’s	article,	
presenting	 mistakes	 this	 way	 reinforces	 the	 idea	 that	 patient	 values	 determine	
welfare	 (welfare	 subjectivism*).	 Lazaroff	 made	 a	 mistake	 because	 he	 failed	 to	 get	
what	he	really	wanted.		
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	 But	why	do	we	need	to	assume	that	Lazaroff	really	had	an	enduring	desire	to	
avoid	the	horrible	ICU	death	described	by	Gawande	in	order	to	see	him	as	making	a	
mistake	by	 choosing	 it?	 	 Presumably	 the	 choice	would	be	 just	 as	bad	 in	 a	 slightly	
different	scenario.	Imagine	a	man	who	has	not	witnessed	his	wife	or	anyone	else	die	
in	 the	 ICU	 and	 so	 currently	 has	 no	 particular	 attitudes	 towards	 such	 an	 outcome.	
This	man	has	not	generally	been	the	kind	of	person	who	adopts	an	aggressive	“fight	
with	 everything	 you	 have”	 mentality	 in	 response	 to	 life	 crises.	 Still,	 when	 he	
develops	 cancer,	 he	 encounters	 many	 examples	 of	 such	 an	 attitude	 towards	 the	
illness,	and	he	comes	to	think	this	is	a	good	attitude	to	take.	He	is	currently	suffering	
a	 great	 deal	 psychologically	 and	 struggling	 to	 accept	 that	 he	 is	 dying.	 When	
presented	with	the	option	of	the	surgery	he	decides	(in	keeping	with	his	new	“fight”	
values)	to	opt	for	it.						
	 Even	though	in	this	case	he	chooses	what	he	currently	most	wants	in	a	robust	
sense	of	want	(there	is	here	no	hint	that	the	choice	stems	from	a	transient	emotional	
reaction),	it	is	still	doubtful	that	his	new	values	are	serving	him	well.	Whether	they	
are	depends	on	facts	about	his	personality,	which	in	turn	shape	how	he	will	actually	
react	 if	 things	go	badly.	But	since	many	(perhaps	even	most)	patients	do	not	react	
well	 to	such	experiences,	 it	still	 seems	reasonable	 to	 try	and	convince	a	patient	 to	
forgo	a	surgery	with	such	high	odds	of	a	grim	death.			
	 According	to	the	mild	objectivity	framework,	what	underwrites	the	reader’s	
conviction	 that	 Lazaroff	 chose	 badly	 is	 not	 what	 we	 know	 about	 his	 values	 pre-
surgery,	but	rather	what	we	know	about	(1)	how	he	actually	died	(he	is	described	as	
suffering	 terribly,	 where	 I	 assume	 this	 includes	 not	 just	 pain,	 but	 psychological	
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suffering	 as	well),	 and	 (2)	what	we	 assume	 are	 the	 facts	 about	what	would	 have	
happened	if	he	had	chosen	differently.	If	he	had	not	opted	for	the	surgery,	he	would	
have	lived	a	bit	 longer,	though	with	increasing	leg	paralysis.	He	could	have	died	at	
home	without	 pain	when	 the	 time	 came.	Of	 course,	 it	 is	 true	 that	 he	might	 never	
have	 fully	 accepted	 his	 imminent	 death	 and	 he	might	 have	 continued	 to	 be	made	
unhappy	by	the	paralysis.	We	shouldn’t	naively	assume	that	the	last	months	at	home	
would	 necessarily	 be	 good.	 But	 even	 so,	 it	 is	 plausible	 that	 his	 overall	 experience	
going	 forward	without	 surgery	would	be	better	 than	 the	experience	he	ultimately	
had.	As	with	the	case	of	Dave,	one	benefit	of	approaching	the	case	this	way	is	that	
students	 then	 focus	 on	what	might	 have	 been	 done	 to	 help	 Lazaroff	 avoid	 such	 a	
mistake.				
	 		The	 mild	 objectivity	 framework	 can	 also	 be	 used	 to	 illustrate	 the	
importance	 of	 certain	 distinctions,	 such	 as	 the	 distinction	 mentioned	 earlier	
between	medical	values	and	welfare	outcomes.	Precisely	because	medical	values	so	
often	 serve	 patient	welfare,	 it	 can	 be	 tempting	 to	 revert	 to	 a	welfare	medicalism	
framework	 when	 confronted	 with	 difficult	 cases.	 But	 the	 theory-without-theories	
approach,	 and	 in	 particular	 the	 mild	 objectivity	 framework,	 offers	 a	 useful	
alternative	that	emphasizes	the	variety	of	ways	medical	values	can	serve	(or	fail	to	
serve)	overall	welfare.			
	 Consider,	for	example,	the	rare	case	of	patients	with	Body	Integrity	Identity	
Disorder	(BIID)	who	strongly	feel	that	one	of	their	limbs	is	not	really	theirs	and	who	
desperately	 want	 someone	 to	 surgically	 amputate	 the	 otherwise	 healthy	 limb	
(Bayne	and	Levy	2005).	Taking	such	cases	seriously	requires	being	at	 least	willing	
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to	consider	whether	amputation	might	 in	fact	be	the	best	option	for	such	patients.	
But	because	removing	a	healthy	limb	is	so	contrary	to	what	doctors	typically	do—
one	could	call	it	a	medical	anti-value—many	people	initially	react	by	insisting	that	it	
simply	can’t	be	good	for	a	person	to	lose	a	limb.	Others	take	the	opposite	view	that	
amputation	is	justified	because	this	is	what	these	patients	most	want.		
	 However,	what	we	really	need	to	know	are	things	such	as	(1)	whether	there	
are	any	non-surgical	options	that	would	leave	such	patients	feeling	better	and	(2)	if	
not,	whether	surgery	would	really	make	them	better	overall	than	they	are	currently.	
Of	course	the	patients	believe	that	the	only	possible	way	to	improve	their	lives	is	to	
amputate	the	limb.	But	what	we	want	to	know	is	whether	they	are	right.		
	 Once	 again	 this	 seems	 to	 depend	 on	 comparative	 facts	 about	 potential	
outcomes.	For	example,	if	it	turned	out	that	after	having	a	limb	amputated	a	person		
simply	transferred	her	concern	to	a	new	limb,	wanting	it	removed,	and	continuing	to	
feel	miserable,	then	the	original	surgery	would	have	caused	disability	(which	is,	at	
least	 somewhat	 negative,	 since	 it	 will	 come	 with	 at	 least	 some	 limitations	 that	
require	 adjustment)	 without	 any	 compensating	 improvement	 in	 terms	 of	 greater	
happiness,	 greater	 engagement,	 or	 less	 suffering.	 The	 framework	 emphasizes	 (as	
seems	right)	that	the	truth	about	what	would	be	best	for	such	patients	depends	on	
future	 facts	 about	 relative	welfare,	 and	 not	 simply	 on	what	 the	 patient	wants,	 or	
what	doctors	typically	do.				
	 Or	consider	a	much	less	dramatic	case:	Most	people	these	days	automatically	
and	unreflectively	think	of	smoking	as	a	deeply	unhealthy	activity—an	activity	that	
a	 doctor	 should	 never	 recommend.	 Like	 healthy	 limb	 amputation	 it	 may	 be	 best	
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characterized	 as	 a	medical	 anti-value.	 However,	 for	 a	 patient	with	 incurable	 lung	
cancer	it	might	be	good	to	smoke,	particularly	if	it	is	unlikely	to	shorten	his	life	any	
more	than	it	already	has	been	by	the	cancer	and	if	the	effort	to	stop	is	making	him	
miserable.	In	short,	once	it	is	true	that	the	values	usually	served	by	non-smoking	are	
no	longer	attainable	for	this	person,	it	may	be	best	for	his	overall	welfare	to	smoke.	
And	in	some	cases	it	may	even	be	appropriate	for	his	doctor	to	say	so	(Ubel	2012).		
	 Finally,	I	believe	that	it	is	only	by	framing	things	in	terms	of	mild	objectivity	
and	better	and	worse	answers	 that	 certain	kinds	of	 familiar	 ethical	debate	 can	be	
presented	 in	 ways	 that	 really	make	 sense.	 For	 example,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 properly	
grasp	 the	 dilemma	 posed	 by	medical	 paternalism	 unless	 one	 first	 sees	 that	 there	
might	be	a	case	where	a	patient	is	wrong	and	a	physician	right	about	what	would	be	
best	 for	the	patient	and	where	the	consequences	of	non-interference	are	dire.	One	
need	not	suppose	that	such	cases	are	common.	But	all	too	often	in	medical	ethics	the	
moral	issues	of	paternalism	are	glossed	over.	A	simplistic	story	is	told	according	to	
which	doctors	used	to	be	paternalistic	 (which	 is	 true)	and	used	to	make	decisions	
for	patients	according	 to	welfare	medicalism	(which	 is	also	mainly	 true).	But	 then	
there	was	 a	 patient’s	 rights	movement,	 choice	was	 given	 to	 patients,	 and	 all	 was	
well.	Simple	welfare	subjectivism	triumphed	over	welfare	medicalism.		
	 On	that	picture	it	is	hard	to	see	why	there	was	ever	much	moral	debate	about	
paternalism.	 On	 this	 picture	 paternalism	 frequently	 harms	 patients,	 and	 the	
alternative—letting	 the	 patient	 choose—	 is	 always	 beneficial,	 or	 at	 least	 almost	
always	so.		There	is	no	real	tug	of	values	here.		
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	 However,	 it	 is	 precisely	 because	 both	 patients	 and	 doctors	 can	 be	 wrong	
about	what	would	be	best,	and	because	 it	 is	 incredibly	hard	for	many	clinicians	to	
stand	by	and	watch	individuals	make	what	seem	to	be	(and	in	some	cases	very	likely	
are)	 self-destructive	 choices,	 that	paternalism	 remains	 a	moral	 temptation.	A	 true	
anti-paternalist	is	someone	who	has	confronted	the	real	range	of	possibilities—who	
sees	 that	 the	 weight	 of	 reasons	 support	 non-intervention—but	 grasps	 that	
commitment	to	anti-paternalism	means	she	may	have	to	allow	someone	to	seriously	
and	irrevocably	harm	himself.		
	 The	Dave	case	and	the	Lazaroff	case	are	good	illustrations	of	this,	since	most	
students	 allow	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 Dave	 is	 making	 a	 mistake,	 and	 likewise	 most	
readers	view	Lazaroff	as	making	one.	Both	cases	lead	students	to	want	to	talk	more	
with	 the	 patients	 in	 question:	 to	 educate	 them	 further	 and	make	 sure	 they	 truly	
grasp	what	 they	are	rejecting	or	choosing.	But	we	cannot	simply	assume	 in	either	
case	 that	 the	patient	will	 change	direction	based	on	more	conversation	or	explicit	
advice.	Whether	or	not	they	do,	the	choice	is	still	theirs	to	make.	Nonetheless,	such	
cases	 provide	 excellent	 opportunities	 for	 considering	 paternalism	 in	 all	 its	
complicated	reality.	Such	cases	illustrate	that	real	values	are	at	stake	either	way,	and	
that	the	choice	to	refrain	from	paternalism,	even	if	best	overall,	is	not	cost-free.		
		 	 	 	
§4.0		Conclusion		
Medical	ethics	needs	a	more	sophisticated,	nuanced	approach	to	thinking	about	the	
well-being	 of	 patients.	 But	 as	 I	 have	 tried	 to	 show,	 introducing	 philosophical	
theories	 of	 well-being	 into	 medical	 ethics	 discussions	 is	 not	 helpful	 and	 often	
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counter-productive.	 This	 does	 not	mean,	 however,	 that	 philosophy	 has	 no	 role	 to	
play.	 It	does.	 I	have	here	outlined	what	I	call	 the	theory-without	theories	approach,	
which	focuses	on	analyzing	important,	relatively	uncontroversial	aspects	of	welfare,	
and	framing	discussion	of	clinical	cases	and	good	clinical	choice	in	terms	of	the	mild	
objectivity	framework.	It	 is	a	philosophical	approach	to	well-being	that	tries	to	get	
as	much	mileage	 as	 possible	 from	 ideas	 about	well-being	 that	 are	widely	 (though	
not	universally)	agreed	upon.	But	it	is	not	a	theory	of	well-being.			
	 Throughout	 the	 paper,	 I	 have	 for	 the	 most	 part	 emphasized	 the	 ways	 in	
which	the	theory-without-theories	model	can	improve	medical	ethics	teaching.	But	it	
was	never	my	intention	to	suggest	that	that	is	its	only	use.	I	genuinely	believe	that	
medical	 ethics	 scholarship	 would	 also	 be	 better	 if	 it	 incorporated	 this	 model	 or	
something	much	 like	 it.	 This	 is	 because	medical	 ethics	 scholarship	would	 benefit	
from	more	 frequent	 and	more	 explicit	 discussions	 of	 patient	 welfare.	 But	 this,	 in	
turn,	 will	 only	 be	 really	 helpful	 if	 scholars	 can	 manage	 to	 avoid	 problematic	
simplifications	 such	 as	welfare	 nihilism	or	welfare	 subjectivism,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	
and	reliance	on	controversial	philosophical	theories.	such	as	objective	list	theories,	
on	 the	other.	Finally,	 if	better	 thinking	about	well-being	were	 to	become	a	part	of	
both	 medical	 ethics	 teaching	 and	 scholarship,	 it	 might	 also	 eventually	 help	 to	
improve	 real-life	 conversations	 between	 doctors	 and	 patients.	 And	 that	 is	 pretty	
much	the	best	outcome	ethicists	can	hope	for.		
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